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European  and  national  cartel  authorities  have  required  dominant  national  gas 
pipelines  to  auction  off  certain  quantities  (typically  about  10  %  of  their  sales)  to 
competitors. Do such auctions really improve the competitiveness of the wholesale 
market? Based on a model where oligopolistic pipelines could voluntarily auction gas 
to  competitors  (or  precommit  on  certain  sales  otherwise)  we  conclude  that  such 
release auctions often have no effect because the additional obligations will simply 
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I. Introduction  
 
After  a  politically  heated  debate,  E.ON,  one  of  the  largest  European  Electricity 
producers,  was  allowed  to  take  over  Ruhrgas,  the  most  important  pipeline  in  the 
European Gas market. The final permission required E.ON to sell a number of shares 
in other German Gas companies. In addition, E.ON was required to auction off, in six 
yearly auctions between 2003 and 2009, 200 billion kWh from their long term import 
contracts to competitors (less than 10 % of its sales, less than 4 % of the German 
wholesale quantities). The contracts auctioned have durations of three years. Since 
2006, after a merger of several energy companies, the Danish company DONG, now 
supplying 95 % of the gas in Denmark, is required to offer gas in a release auction 
which  constitutes  10  %  of  the  Danish  gas  market.  In  this  auction  quantities  are 
exchanged  with  quantities  in  the  UK,  Belgium,  and  German  market  so  that 
competition not only in Denmark but also in other European countries seems to profit. 
Further  gas  release  auctions  take  place  in  Austria,  France,  and  Hungary.  In  the 
electricity sector, since 2001 (2003) the French EDF (the Belgium Electrabel) offers 
6000 MW (1200 MW) of virtual power plant capacity in yearly auctions.  
 
Can such auctions really improve competition? In the following we will concentrate on 
the gas market and only in the conclusion we will argue that similar arguments apply 
to the electricity market 
 
The fundamental question is whether or not capacity auctions will increase the total 
quantity offered in the market. Otherwise, consumers cannot profit. The reason why 
the  auctioning  firms  may  increase  their  supply  is  that  auctioning  is  a  form  of 
precommitment. After these quantities are sold they do no longer enter directly the 
profit calculations. Similar arguments show that a futures market can increase the 
competition in an oligopoly of producers
1 (Allaz, 1992; Powell, 1993; Bolle, 1993). 
 
In  the  next  section,  we  will  ask  when  there  is  an  incentive  for  gas  importers  to 
increase their quantities offered after a forced gas release auction. In section III, we 
will ask which quantities such an importer would offer voluntarily to his non-importing 
                                            
1 There is also experimental evidence for such an competition enhancing effect of futures markets (Le 
Coq and Orzen, 2006). 
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competitors.  As  in  the  case  of  futures  markets,  selling  to  competitors  may  be 
attractive for the individual importer while the group of importers suffers. They play a 
Prisoners’  Dilemma  (or  Public  Goods)  game.  Though  there  are  similarities  in  the 
argument (precomment) the model of the gas market with its Take or Pay contracts is 
completely  different  from  the  above  mentioned  models.  Section  IV  describes  the 
differences and the common attributes with respect to electricity and concludes.  
 
II. The effect of forced release auctions 
 
Imagine  a  situation  where  a  country  imports  all  its  gas  quantities  or  where  the 
domestic production is fixed. The importing companies I1. … In have concluded Take-
or-Pay  (ToP)  contracts  with  fixed  quantities.  These fixed  quantities  determine  the 
market price via the inverse demand function of the consumers. Can there be any 
effect from gas release auctions? The total quantity remains the same and thus the 
market price (which is equal to the auction price of the release quantities). 
 
In  the  short  run,  only  if  the ToP  contracts allow  the  importers  to  order  additional 
quantities at low enough prices can there be an effect. In a ToP contract a quantity zi 
is fixed which has to be payed with gizi whether or not it is demanded by the contract 
partner (see Figure 1). So the marginal costs of importer Ii is, up to zi, equal to 0. 
Usually, additional quantities can be ordered (again limited, which is not indicated in 
Figure 1) at marginal costs ci > gi = average price of zi. In the long run, new ToP 
contracts may be concluded, probably, however, also with average prices higher than 
gi. So let us assume that, in any case, additional quantities can be supplied with 











Figure 1: Take or Pay contracts 
 
Assumption: Consumer behaviour is described by a linear inverse demand function 
p = a – bs, s = total quantity offered. There is quantity competition. 
 
Ideally, p is the spot market price. In the gas sector, however, spot markets do not 
play an important role in Continental Europe. The pipelines deliver gas to customers 
(retailers,  industry)  under  long-term  contracts.  In  Germany,  the  regulator 
Bundesnetzagentur  has  recently  restricted  the  maximal  duration  of  “dominant” 
contracts” to 2 years (80 % to full supply)  or 4 years (50 % to 80 % of supply). So, 
it’s the market for such contracts which is described by the inverse demand function. 
From  the  perspective  of  the  (insignificant)  spot  market  these  contracts  are  also 
precommitments.  From  the  viewpoint  of  this  contract  market,  gas  releases  to  a 
“competitive  fringe”  outside  the  oligopoly  of  importers  are  precommitments.  The 
“competitive fringe” will resell the quantities in any case, it does not take into account 
the effect of these sales on the market price. 
 
Let us first investigate a market where ToP contracts have been concluded but no 
release auctions take place. Profits and marginal profits of an individual firm Ii after 
offering quantities xi > 0 (in addition to the ToP quantities zi) or xi < 0 are 
 
(1)   Gi = (zi + xi) (a – bz –bx) – Ci(xi) -gzi   
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Lemma 1: The equilibrium quantities xi



















c   r   for    
2
r 0   for              0











i    
with ri = a – b ( i i x z z - + + ) and x-i =  ∑
¹i j
j x . 
 
Proof: For xi ® -¥ or xi ® +¥ Gi takes arbitrarily large negative values. So, without 
restriction of generality, we can assume that xi is restricted to an interval. (3) shows 
that Gi is a concave function of xi. The best reply functions (4) are continuous in x-i 
(see Figure 1). Thus there exists a pure strategy equilibrium (xi
*)i=1,  …,  n which, of 










Figure 1: i’s best reply function 
 
Now let us introduce the obligation of importers to auction release quantities yi to 
non-importing traders (pipelines). 
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Assumption: As the purchase payments are sunk, y = ∑yi will be supplied to market. 
 
After yi has been sold, the situation has changed: The market price p applies only to 
(zi – yi + xi) which may cause Ii to offer larger quantities than when p refers to zi + xi 
as in (1). 
 
(5)  Gi = (zi – yi + xi) (a – b(z+ x)) + yi × q – xi × Ci
’ – zi × gi 
 
with x = ∑xi, q = price in the auction market. 
(6)  '
i i i i
i
i C bx by bz bx bz a
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By comparing (2) and (5) we see that Lemma 1 applies after substituting zi by zi – yi. 
If 
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then xi > 0, i.e. larger quantities than zi are offered and the market price p decreases. 
 
Assuming  that  yi  cannot  surpass  zi,  a  necessary  condition  for  the  possibility  to 
increase competition by release auctions is p = a – bz > ci, i. e. it must be profitable 
to market gas beyond the ToP-quantities zi. 
 
Proposition  1:  A  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  to  stimulate  competition 
(decrease prices) by gas release auctions is 
 
(8)  i c p >  for at least one i, 
accompanied by sufficiently large yi. 
 
Proof:  If  (8)  applies  then,  with  yi  =  zi  for  all  i,  some  i  have  an  incentive  to  offer 
additional quantities xi > 0. Otherwise, because of yi £ zi, no i will offer additional 
quantities. 
 
Remarks:    
(i) The necessity of this condition is trivial, the sufficiency is not. 
  8
 
(ii) If market entry is easy or if producer power is large then p will be close to gi and, 
because of ci > gI, release auctions will be ineffective. 
 
(iii) If p is above the monopoly price then importers as well as gas producers may 
have a collective interest in high ci. The individual interest of importer Ii, however, 
may still require low ci. 
 
III. Voluntary release quantities 
 
Do the importers have an incentive to auction off quantities yi >0 voluntarily? Do they, 
even  without  regulatory  enforcement,  deliver  certain  quantities  to  competitors? 
Empirically, they do: only 7 nationwide active pipelines import gas or produce gas of 
their own. They deliver gas not only to retailers and industry but and sell it also to 
other wholesale pipelines. We must keep in mind, however, that the exclusive areas 
from the previous cartel era are still rather effective. Thus, empirically these deliveries 
are more to regional monopolists than to competitors. An enforced auction may have 
two advantages, namely 
 
(i)  The competitors have access to larger quantities than the importers offer 
them voluntarily. 
(ii)  The competitors get their gas at “market prices” and not in negotiations 
with a restricted number of importers. 
 
The advantage of (ii) is difficult to evaluate and, for consumers, it seems to be less 
important than (i). So let us concentrate on (i). In order to be effective the required 
gas release quantities must be larger than the voluntary quantities. Otherwise the 
latter might, in the long run, be simply crowded out by the further. As the importers 
have concluded long-term contracts with the other pipelines, in the short run, i.e. if no 
previous  adjustment  is  possible,  (i)  is  answered  positively.  A  second  important 
question is whether the voluntary delivery to competitors is planned while the pipeline 
concluded the ToP contracts. In this case, these quantities are encluded in zi and 
thus purchased at costs gi.  
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In the following analysis we assume that the pipelines planned to auction off certain 
quantities  yi,  i.e.  these  quantities  are  included  in  the  ToP  contracts  and  that  the 
pipelines could choose these quantities at given average prices gi. So, the play the 
following “Gas Importers’ Game”:  
 
1.  Stage: The importers choose ToP quantities zi which are available at costs gI 
zi and   auction quantities yi.  
2.  Stage:  The  importers  choose  to  offer  zi  -  yi  or  to  deviate  from  zi  -  yi  by 
quantities xi < 0 or > 0. 
 
The  second  stage  has  been  analysed  in  Section  II.  From  Lemma  1  and  the 
substitution of zi by zi - yi follows that (4) applies with ri = a – b( ) i i i x y z z - + - +   
 
(4) implies that xi
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At the time when the quantities yi are auctioned the buyers expect p
*. We assume 
Bertrand  competition  among  these  buyers  (bidders)  and  thus  p
*  =  q.  Thus  i’s 
expected profit (when he decides about zi and yi) is 
 
(11)  Gi =(zi + xi
*) (a – b (z + x
*)) – xi
*Ci
’ - zigi. 
 
Proposition 2: If 
 










then there is a continuum of equilibria of the Gas Importers’ Game with xi
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 




< g , which does not seem to be too demanding could be substituted by the 
even weaker condition (A18). 
 
The first part of (12) tells us something about participation. Only those importers are 





i g . If, for some of the n importers, this condition is not 
fulfilled then n is reduced. 
 
Is the precommitment by the release auction beneficial for the consumers? If there 
was, first, an auction market, followed, second, by the conclusion of ToP-contracts 
then the precommitment would be always beneficial for the consumers (Allaz, 1992, 
Bolle, 1993, Powell, 1993). But such a sequence of action is unprobable in the gas 
market where ToP contracts have a duration up to 40 years. In the above game, the 
decisions about zi and yi took place at the same time. Do the consumers still profit? 
Cournot competition with costs gI yields equilibrium quantities  i z ~  with 
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because of (12) and (13). In particular, if ci and gI differ a lot, then z ~ is much smaller 
than  * z , but also for gI = ci we find  * ~ z z < . 
 
As  we  mentioned  before,  in  order  to  avoid  “crowding  out”  the  enforced  auction 
quantities have to be larger than the voluntary quantities. So let us try to estimate the 
share  y*/z*.  From  (14)  follows  that  his  share  is  maximal  for  the  maximal  y
*  and 
minimal for the minimal y
*. So, using (13), we get 
 































IV. Conclusion  
 
There are no really reliable estimations of the gas demand. Liu (2004) finds long run 
price elasticities for natural gas between -0.78 and 0.08 for OECD countries. In the 
following, we use two alternative values, namely h = -0.2 and h = -0.7 for the demand 
of retailers and large industrial consumers. As van Damme (2004) proposes when 
applying a linear demand model to the Dutch electricity market we “calibrate” our 
linear  demand  to  the  elasticities,  i.e.  we  assume  a  =  0
1








  where  p0  is  the 
current price. 
 
For Germany, we have an average p0 for retailers of 3 cent/kwh (Pfaffenberger and 
Gabriel, 2006). The import price of Russian gas was about 230 $ (200 Euro)/1000 m
3 
in 2006 which is equal to about gi = 0.5 cent/kwh. We disregard transport costs on the 
wholesale level within Germany which are less than 10 % of the import price. For ci, 
the price of gas quantities beyond theToP quantities, we assume two values, namely 






Table 1. If we assume, for Germany, n = 7 we find that voluntary releases cover at 
least 29 % of the market. Even if we assume that, in the long run, there will be only 3 
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14 %. So the enforced Ruhrgas release auction of less than 4 % of the German 
market (less than 10 % of the Ruhrgas sales) can hardly be effective. 
 
In our model, we have assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that precommitment takes 
place only by gas releases for competitors. It seems more plausible, however, that 
some or most of this precommitment takes other forms. There was a tendency to 
conclude really long-term contracts also with retailers and industrial customers. After, 
however,  the  duration  of  such  contracts  is  legally  restricted  the  oligopolists  have 
again to look for other forms of precommitment. One substitute of long-term contracts 
or  voluntary  releases  may  be  vertical  integration.  In  Germany,  we  observe  an 
increasing  share  of  retail  companies  being  totally  or  partially  owned  by  the  big 
importers E.ON and RWE. These are also the two biggest players in the German 
electricity market and we have to note that the retailers which they (partially or totally) 
own often distribute gas as well as electricity. 
 
  ci = 0.8 cent/kwh  ci = 1.2 cent/kwh 
a = 15 cent/kwh 
( ) ( ) 053 . 0 1 036 . 0 1
*
*





( ) ( ) 08 . 0 1 055 . 0 1
*
*




a = 7 cent/kwh 
( ) ( ) 114 . 0 1 079 . 0 1
*
*





( ) ( ) 171 . 0 1 121 . 0 1
*
*






Table 1: Shares of voluntary gas releases for different assumptions about ci and a. 
 
We conclude that, in Germany, gas release auctions are ineffective. Even in France 
where, since 2000, Gaz de France lost 30 % of its industrial customers, small scale 
auctions cannot be expected to have an impact. In Denmark however, where DONG 
has a 95 % market share, the release auction of 10 % of DONG’s supply may have at 
least some effect. 
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How fits electricity in our model? Electricity is (mainly) domestically produced and not 
imported. Additional quantities, however, can be delivered in the short run – as in the 
gas case – only with higher marginal costs. The spot market is far more important for 
electricity than for gas. There also exists a liquid futures market. In electricity, we 
could distinguish precommitment on two (interrelated) markets: the spot market and 
the  contract  market  for  retailers/industrial  customers.  Electricity  release  auctions 
would lead to “fringe supply” on both markets. 
 
In the German electricity market, E.On, RWE, Vattenfall, and EnBW (EdF) produce 
80 % of the electricity consumed in Germany. If we apply (18) with n = 4 or n = 5 
production costs gi » 3 cent/kwh, ci » 4 cent/kwh a spot market price p0 = 5 cent/kwh 
and e = -0.2 (see van Damme, 2006), we arrive at the conclusion that these firms 
should try to precommit 50 % of their production which may be done, with respect to 
the  spot  market,  by  forward  trading  and  contracts  with  retailers.  It  is  difficult  to 
imagine that a forced release auction would be concerned with more than 10 % of 
the production of these firms which therefore could and would be crowded out. The 
variation of the above assumptions in a sensible region of prices and elasticities does 
not change this conclusion. In France, things are different. EdF is a quasi-monopolist. 
Thus electricity release auctions probably have an effect.  
 
Our general conclusion is that release auctions are only effective in the beginning of 
the transformation from a monopoly to a competitive system. With some competition, 
however, i.e. active competitors, such auctions must cover a high share of the market 
in order to be effective. But that would be expropriation and not liberalisation.  
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Proof of Proposition 2 
 
For ri ¹ 0, ci we differentiate Gi with respect to yi and zi. 
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If the equilibrium values (yi
*, zi





























2 , these optimality conditions 
require 
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As both equations contain only parameters, they could be fulfilled only by chance (a 





































. Now, because of ci > gI, (16) is positive and (17) is 
negative. So we have to conclude that ri = 0 or ri = ci have to be fulfilled for every i, 
i.e. xi
* = 0. 
 
Now we will ask whether ri = ci or ri = 0 can be fulfilled in equilibrium. If not, then no 
pure strategy equilibrium exists. So, in the following, we will ask whether deviations zi 
± e or yi ± e pay. For this purpose we determine the upper and lower derivations of Gi 
with respect to zi and yi for ri = ci (ri =0) and xj
* = 0, j = 1, …, n. So we set x-i
* = 0 in 
the computation of the derivative but xi
* = 0 only after the computation. 
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From (A1), (A2) and ri = a – b(z + zi –yi + x-i) follows under these conditions (xj = 0) 
that, for ri ¹ 0, ci, 
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 is computed in the following way: If zi is increased then ri 
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We argue similarly for the other derivations. If zi is decreased then ri is increased 









. So, for ri = ci, the lower derivative with 
respect to zi is 
 










Therefore, decreasing zi would cause lower profits. 
 
If we increase yi then ri increases which again implies xi
* > 0 (Ci










. So, the condition that such a deviation is not profitable is 























.  This  deviation  is  not 
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(A9)  is  always  fulfilled  and  (A8),  (A10),  (A11)  are  fulfilled  under  the  condition  of 
Proposition 2. So, such combinations of (zi
*, yi
*) values constitute equilibria of the Gas 
Importers’ Game. 
 






















So, for ri = 0, it would always be profitable to reduce zi. 
 
(A10) and (A11) are implied by (13). Under (12), (A8) is weaker than (A10). So all 
equilibrium conditions can be fulfilled if (12) holds. We get z
* by summing up the 
equations ri = ci, and then p
* and zi





so (12) implies that p
* > gI, i.e. all importers make a profit. (12) and (13) imply that zi
* 
> yi
*. 
 
 